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ARTICLES
Democracy and the Role of Parliament
Under the Eritrean Constitution
Bereket Habte Selassiet
Eritrea's constitutional moment stretched out for three years,
from April 1994 to May 1997.1 The Eritrean experience of
constitution-making was marked by large-scale and intense public
participation in village and town meetings at which most of the
main issues were raised and debated. Among the issues raised by
the public, none was more vigorously debated than the question of
government power and how it impinges on the rights of the
people.2 The problem of power and how different societies, at
different times, have dealt with it is always a fascinating subject to
contemplate; it becomes a crucial matter when one is engaged in
creating the Constitution by which such power will be regulated.
In Eritrea the people followed the process with great interest every
step of the way, until the Constitution was ratified on May 23,
t William E. Leuchtenburg Professor of African Studies, The University of North
Carolina at Chapel Hill. LL.B. 1956, University of London; Ph.D. 1967, University of
London. Dr. Selassie, a native of Eritrea, served as chairman of the Eritrean
Constitutional Commission from 1994 to 1997. He has also served in several Ethiopian
government positions prior to the war for Eritrean independence, including Judge of the
Federal Supreme Court from 1958-62 and Attorney General from 1962-64. His books
include The Executive in African Governments (1974), Conflict and Intervention in the
Horn of Africa (1980), and Eritrea and the United Nations (1988).
By constitutional moment, I mean the meeting point between a nation's past,
present, and future, the time when all the principal constitutional issues are-or should
be-confronted and debated: the basic principles of governance, the rights and duties of
citizens, and the powers and responsibilities of government.
2 See CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION OF ERITREA, CONSTITUTIONAL PROPOSALS FOR
PUBLIC DEBATE 18-27 (1995) [hereinafter CCE: PROPOSALS]. Many other issues were
raised and debated, including the structure of the government, electoral system, political
pluralism, and religion and the state. See id.
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1997.
The focus of this Article is the role of Parliament in a
democratic system of government, in the abstract as well as under
the Eritrean Constitution. Parliament is a critical institution and is
conceived as such under the Eritrean Constitution. The Eritrean
Parliament is designed to ensure the healthy political development
of the new nation. The Eritrean Constitutional Commission laid
particular emphasis on this point throughout the constitution-
making process, and I stressed it in my final address to the Council
of the Commission upon the submission of the draft Constitution.4
This Article offers a summary of the contemporary discourse
on the meaning of democracy in a larger historical context in Part
.
5 Part II outlines the modern history of Parliament as a
representative institution in relation to the concept of democracy,
by reference to its evolution in Europe.6 Part III discusses
electoral systems in general,7 while Part IV discusses the
composition and function of Eritrea's Parliament.' In Part V the
role of Parliament and parliamentary process under the Eritrean
Constitution is examined.9 Finally, Part VI concludes by assessing
the prospect of parliamentary democracy and the corresponding
challenges facing the Eritrean Parliament.'0
I. The Meaning of Democracy
An important part of the contemporary discourse on the
meaning of democracy concerns the criteria applied to evaluate
democracy or progress to democratic transition, as the case may
be, particularly in countries of the "South" or developing
3 See generally Bereket Habte Selassie, Creating a Constitution for Eritrea, J.
DEMOCRACY, Apr. 1998, at 164 (outlining the creation of the Eritrean Constitution and
the presentation of the draft to the public for debate).
' See Report of the Chairman of the Constitutional Commission to the Council of
the Commission, at 3, June 22, 1996 (on file with author).
5 See infra notes 11-37 and accompanying text.
6 See infra notes 38-55 and accompanying text.
7 See infra notes 56-90 and accompanying text.
8 See infra notes 91-162 and accompanying text.
I See infra notes 163-90 and accompanying text.
10 See infra notes 191-201 and accompanying text.
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countries. The debate on the meaning of democracy has focused
essentially on its substance-its source and purpose-on the one
hand, and its procedure on the other." The classical approach
defined democracy in terms of its source and purpose, with the
will of the people as source and the common good as purpose."
However, according to the prevailing school of thought in modem
times, the central feature of democracy is procedural; it concerns
the selection of leaders through competitive elections by the
people. 3 The pioneer of this approach in modem times is Joseph
Schumpeter. '4 Schumpeter advanced an alternative to the classical
approach, which he called the democratic method. 5 He defined
this as the "institutional arrangement for arriving at political
decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by
means of a competitive struggle for the people's vote."' 6
The essence of democracy is thus reduced to method. This
"methodism," or proceduralism, may be characterized as the
movement away from the normative toward the pragmatic
conception of democracy. 7 According to this conception of
democracy, a political system today would be democratic, "to the
extent that its most powerful collective decision makers are
selected through fair, honest, and periodic elections in which
candidates freely compete for votes and in which virtually all the
adult population is eligible to vote."' 8
Two critical elements are posited in this definition: popular
participation and the competition of candidates representing
different interests or ideologies." An additional element, which
" See SAMUEL HUNTINGTON, THE THIRD WAVE: DEMOCRATIZATION IN THE LATE
TwENTIETH CENTURY 6 (1991).
12 See JOSEPH SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM, AND DEMOCRACY 269 (2d ed.
1947).
13 See id.
14 See HUNTINGTON, supra note 11, at 6.
"5 See SCHUMPETER, supra note 12, at 269.
16 HUNTINGTON, supra note 11, at 6.
17 See id. at 7; see also Larry Diamond, Is the Third Wave Over?, J. DEMOCRACY,
July 1996, at 20 (elaborating on the minimalist approach to democracy).
18 HUNTINGTON, supra note 11, at 7.
19 See id. at 6.
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marks the latest phase of the on-going debate, is highlighted in the
writings of Robert Dahl.20  Dahl has developed the concept of
"polyarchy,"' in which he underscores the importance of freedom
of speech and press for meaningful pluralist politics. 22  Dahl's
point is that without these "civil freedoms," the elements of
participation and competition will be negated, in that people may
not be able to express their political preferences in a meaningful
23
way.
Implicit in this concept of electoral democracy is the
conviction that popular participation and competition are crucial
components of democratic government, whether it is
parliamentary or presidential in character.24 But questions remain.
Does this minimalist (procedural) conception embrace other
critical requirements for a meaningful democratic government?
Do elections constitute the only core element of democracy?
To the extent that Parliament, as a representative institution, is
the primary national institution accountable to the citizens of a
country, election to this institution is a crucial part of democracy.
It is, in theory, the principal mediator in the dialectic of the
governors and the governed. There is an inherent tension in that
dialectic even in the best of circumstances, and the citizens'
representatives are-or should be-the first line of defense for the
protection of the rights of the constituents. Electoral laws and
politics can thus be regarded as prerequisites of democratic
(parliamentary) government. But once elected, Parliament has
constitutional responsibilities that do not end with the conclusion
of an election; in short, election is a means to an end. The end-
the function of Parliament-constitutes, or reflects, the substantive
aspect of democracy. The procedural imperative, though essential,
must be analyzed in relation to the role of Parliament in the totality
of a constitutional order.
20 See ROBERT DAHL, POLYARCHY: PARTICIPATION AND OPPOSITION (1971).
2 1 Dahl defines polyarchies as "regimes that have been substantially popularized
and liberalized, that is, highly inclusive and extensively open to public contestation."
Id. at 8.
22 See id.
23 See id. at 1-8.
24 See id. at 5-6; HUNTINGTON, supra note 11, at 6-7.
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Moreover, when considering whether parliamentary or
electoral politics, per se, meet all the requirements of democracy,
it must be borne in mind that government does not function in a
vacuum. The overall historical context-the economic condition,
the social milieu and cultural heritage of the country, as well as the
political environment-combine to influence the outcome of the
democratic process. There is also the role of leadership. In the
dynamic interaction of theory and practice, of principle and
politics, the role of leadership is critical in any historical context.
A wise and able leadership ensures optimal public participation in
all political matters and should be at pains to guarantee the rule of
law and see to it that social justice is secured to the best of the
nation's ability. In all such endeavors, good leadership is expected
to look beyond temporary advantages and into the future.25
At this point, some of the basic questions raised by the public
during the extensive public consultation in Eritrea's constitution-
making process of 1994-1997 may be of interest. As already
noted, the role of government under the rule of law was one of the
most frequently raised and debated topics. 26  The principal
concerns that most people voiced during those debates may be
characterized as: (1) government accountability and transparency;
(2) the need for multiparties to secure accountability and
transparency; and (3) economic policy and social justice." The
first two issues are in line with the minimalist conception of
democracy and constitutional government. They have been
answered by Eritrea's Constitution, under which they are
guaranteed.2" The third issue is not covered under the current
conception of democracy. This conception, therefore, falls short
of being an adequate criterion for judging the democratic record of
25 A point worth stressing is the distinction between wisdom and ability; the two
do not necessarily go together. See Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., On Leadership, in
INTRODUCTION TO HAILE SELASSIE 7, 7-11 (Askale Negash ed. 1989). Schlesinger
writes: "[T]he idea of leadership affirms the capacity of individual to move, inspire, and
mobilize masses of people so that they act together in pursuit of an end." Id. at 7.
26 See CCE: PROPOSALS, supra note 2, at 18-27.
27 See id.
28 See ERI. CONST. art. 7.
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a country.29
Underscoring the primacy of social justice and the economic
development that must underpin it, Eritrea's governing party, the
People's Front for Democracy and Justice (PFDJ), considers rapid
economic growth to be a prerequisite for democracy. ° The
improvement of living conditions for the greater mass of the
population is an overriding priority for the PFDJ, and it has
expressed serious doubts as to whether a multiparty system would
achieve that goal at the present." The PFDJ leadership is fearful
that a multiparty system might adversely affect the goal of rapid
growth, as well as the stability required for such growth and for
good governance in general.32 The implication is that it may be
quite a while before the country will have multiple parties, and
that, consequently, Parliament would be solely or predominantly
composed of members of the governing party for the foreseeable
future. Given Eritrea's historical circumstances, the logic of
PFDJ's policy of rapid economic growth as a priority is
irresistible. However, even assuming that a multiparty system is
an obstacle to rapid economic growth in the short run, one would
nonetheless need a quantum leap of faith to believe that a single-
party regime will bring about prosperity.33
29 When "donor" government spokespersons preach democracy to "Third World"
governments, invariably imposing it as a condition for economic assistance, they have
such a minimalist conception in mind. It is often expressed as if it is a commodity
exchange. For instance, in 1991, Mr. Herman Cohen, former Assistant Secretary of
State for African Affairs admonished the Ethiopian and Eritrean leaders after the fall of
the Mengistu government to adopt democracy. "No democracy, no aid," he said. The
author was a member of the Eritrean People's Liberation Front at this time, and was
informed of Cohen's admonition by a member of the delegation to a May 1991 London
meeting. Cohen brokered a settlement for a peaceful transfer of power from the
government of the Dergue to the victorious guerrilla forces. The Author's source
remains anonymous at his request.
30 See CHARTER OF THE POPULAR FRONT FOR DEMOCRACY AND JUSTICE OF ERrrREA
9 (1992) (on file with author).
31 See President Isaias Afwerki, Democracy in Africa: An African View, Address
at the Walton Park Conference, West Sussex, U.K. (Sept. 8, 1997).
32 See id.
33 See DAHL, supra note 20, at 30-31. Dahl points out that the argument for the
necessity of a single-party regime fails because "one cannot logically defend the single
party as an expression of 'natural' consensus and also argue that it is required in order to
build national solidarity out of tribal diversity and disharmony." Id. at 31.
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It is hard to ignore the cautionary tales of the corruption and
waste of African single-party regimes over the past thirty years.34
Most of them started out with promises of future prosperity, based
on the false assumption that a short-term sacrifice-an exchange,
so to speak, of bread for liberty-would eventually pay ample
dividends through economic prosperity and social progress. But
bread and liberty are not, and should never be, mutually exclusive,
and democracy and development should go hand in hand. In any
case, Africa's recent history has shown that the "short-term"
proved to be too long, and the promised goods were not
delivered.36  This leads to a necessary caveat: whatever the
circumstances that may extenuate the postponement of multiple
parties, there must be a time frame within which a single-party
system must give way to a multiparty system.
The better approach to this subject is to think of democratic
politics and development, or democratization, in dynamic terms, as
a sort of work in progress, rather than as a settled matter.37 This is
not to say that there are no fundamental principles governing the
subject. There are such principles and, in the section that follows,
I attempt to state these and place them in historical perspective.
However, it cannot be overstressed that, once in place,
governments can misuse or abuse their power. Therefore,
principles and mechanisms of control should be put in place and
their operation watched with vigilance in order to hold
governments accountable. A vigorous Parliament is one such
mechanism.
But what if the members of Parliament all belong to, and are
beholden to, the governing party, in the absence of other
contending parties? Are there other effective mechanisms that can
make up for the absence of a parliamentary check on governmental
4 See M. Crawford Young, Africa: An Interim Balance Sheet, J. DEMOCRACY,
July 1996, at 53, passim.
31 See id. at 54-55.
36 See id. at 65-67.
37 Various theories have been advanced and variables suggested to explain
democratization. See HUNTINGTON, supra note 11, at 37-38. Huntington lists 27
variables that have been said to contribute to democracy and democratization. See id.
Prominent among these are economic development and a dynamic middle class
(bourgeoisie) that is the active ingredient of development. See id.
1999]
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power? Different countries may provide different answers to this
question. But one thing is certain: traditional institutions cannot
effectively perform the required function of control. Hence, the
need arises for new, constitutionally guaranteed principles and
mechanisms of accountability.
II. Parliament and the Democratic Idea
As demonstrated in the previous section, democracy is not
solely about elections. In this section, the development of the
democratic idea in modem times is traced in relation to
representative government by reference to its advent in Europe, its
modem birth place.
Ours is the age of democracy. This should perhaps be
qualified by adding the adjective "representative" to democracy.
Only a few extremists now dispute the fact that democracy is the
most desirable political system; even autocratic rulers pay lip
service to it. 8  It has taken over two hundred years of
philosophical discourse and political struggle for the democratic
idea to gain universal acceptance. 9 But, as noted above, it is a
malleable concept, subject to different interpretations to advance
different ends. It is also facing challenges, as low election
turnouts demonstrate. n
In modern times, democracy's essential features were defined
by the philosophical discourse of eighteenth century France and its
application in what would become the United States of America.'
38 See DAHL, supra note 20, at 5. Dahl observes that "[o]nly a handful of countries
have failed to grant at least a ritualistic vote to their citizens and to hold at least nominal
elections." Id.
'9 See HUNTINGTON, supra note 11, at 13-30.
4 See Fernando Henrique Cardoso, In Praise of the Art of Politics, J. DEMOCRACY,
July 1996, at 7, 8. Cardoso, a former academic and current president of Brazil, writes:
The need to inject new life into representative democracy has become manifest
in every country that has adopted this political system. It must contend with
growing lack of interest in politics, low voter turnout, and even more seriously,
hostility toward professional politicians that has reached the point where
"opposing mainstream politicians" has become a winning electoral strategy.
Id.
41 "The concept of democracy as a form of government goes back to the Greek
philosophers." HUNTINGTON, supra note 11, at 5. Its modern origin can be traced to the
"revolutionary upheavals in Western society at the end of the eighteenth century." Id. at
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Before the explosion of the revolutionary discourse of late
eighteenth century France and early nineteenth century Europe, the
word "democracy" was generally used to designate an obsolete
type of political system.42
Definitions of democracy as "a form of government in which
offices are distributed by lot" appeared even in the works of
Montesquieu and Rousseau.43 Montesquieu explains this in terms
of fairness and motivation."a Rousseau repeats these formulations,
adding that only suffrage by lot does no harm to equality.
It seems unlikely that either of these great thinkers could have
imagined that democracy, thus defined, would be applicable to the
modern world. It was an ideal type that would work, as Rousseau
noted, "if there were a nation of gods. 46  The historical
significance of their writings lies in the revolutionary implication
of the concept of democracy. The revolutionary implication of the
idea of democracy in modern times lies in the process of
5-6.
42 See Pierre Rosanvallon, The History of the Word Democracy in France, J.
DEMOCRACY, June 1997, at 140, 140. Rosanvallon has confirmed this conclusion on the
basis of a study of pre-revolutionary France's dictionaries. See id at 140-41.
43 Id. at 141. Charles Louis de Secondat, Baron de la Bride et de Montesquieu
(1689-1755) was a French historian and jurist who first wrote systematically about
democracy and its application to modem government. See generally David Wallace
Carrithers, Introduction to MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF LAWS 3 (1949) (tracing
Montesquieu's life and work). Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712-1778) was one of the most
influential eighteenth century philosophers whose writings, notably Du Contrat Social,
influenced the French Revolution and the course of democratic movements of
subsequent centuries. See Christopher Betts, Introduction to ROUSSEAU, DISCOURSE ON
POLITICAL ECONOMY AND THE SOCIAL CONTRACT xi (1994) (tracing Rousseau's life and
work). According to Rosanvallon, authoritative works like Montesquieu's L'Esprit des
Lois and Rousseau's Du Contrat Social rescued the idea of democracy from its
association with the archaic and advanced it to represent the twin principles of self-
government and legitimacy. See Rosanvallon, supra note 42, at 141. Montesquieu
notes that it is "a fundamental law in democracies that the people should have the sole
power to enact laws." Id. (quoting MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS bk. 2, ch. 2,
para. 27 (1949)).
4 See id. at 142. "Suffrage by lot is natural to democracy.... [S]uffrage by lot is
a method of electing that offends no one, but animates each citizen with the pleasing
hope of serving his country." Id. (quoting MONTESQUIEU, ESPRIT DES LOIS, bk. 2, ch. 2,
paras. 18-19 (1748)).
45 See id. at 142.
46 JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, DISCOURSE ON POLITICAL ECONOMY AND THE SOCIAL
CONTRACT 102 (1994).
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institution building from the popular base.47 It was revolutionary
in that it implied, and eventually led to, the destruction of the old
feudal order and its replacement by elected representatives. The
concept of democracy eventually yielded to that of popular
sovereignty. Popular sovereignty, in turn, yielded to
representative government.
As an expression of democracy, representative government
became irresistible in modem nation states.48 As nations grew in
size-larger than the city-states of ancient Athens, or the
traditional village community-and the technicalities of the
modem polity became more complex, representative government
seemed to be the only solution.49 The resurgence of democracy in
the post-Industrial Revolution period was connected with a phase
of political struggle in which the people played a central part.5 °
Democracy and representative government, hitherto viewed as
technically distinct, now became one in tracing power to a popular
base, resting on the people's soyereignty." It is generally agreed
that the rapid economic development of nineteenth century
Europe, with industrialization as the driving engine, was one of the
primary causes of democratization, with the emergence of the
bourgeoisie as the ascendant class and urbanization as the
concomitant development of industrialization." The individualism
of the earlier, pastoral society was replaced by solidarity implicit
in the defense of the collective interest of the working class.53 This
47 See HUNTINGTON, supra note 11, at 109.
48 See id. at 31-108 (explaining waves of democratization).
49 See id.
50 See DAHL, supra note 20, at 23-24.
51 See SALVO MASTELLONE, A HISTORY OF DEMOCRACY IN EUROPE 61, 76 (1995).
Alexis de Tocqueville, in his 1835 examination of the newly formed United States of
America, called this synthesis "democratic liberty," where "all the citizens form the
people, and the people nominate those who make the law." Id. at 61. Shortly thereafter,
Giuseppe Mazzini, an Italian exile writing for the English newspaper People's Journal,
began to advocate "a representative democracy with members elected by the people,
characterized by the association of labour and capital, aimed at human and social
progress." Id. at 76.
52 See HUNTINGTON, supra note 11, at 39.
3 See MASTELLONE, supra note 51, at 64-69, 131-37 (tracing the development of
democratic unions and discussing political structures in modem society).
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socio-economic development provided a solid political base for
democracy.
Representative democracy is a more complex form of self-
government by the people than the more direct form of self-
government associated with the Athenian polis. The modern state
brought many such communities together, making representative
government an imperative. 4 This fact necessitated the adoption of
a mechanism for electing people's representatives at the national
level, in accordance with the requirements of the times.5 Electoral
systems provide that mechanism.
III. Democracy and Electoral Systems
An electoral system constitutes the meeting point between
popular sovereignty and representative government.56 It deals with
how the citizens' voting rights-the primary expression of their
sovereignty-are translated into parliamentary seats." In these
parliamentary seats resides legislative power, with its associated
powers of control of the purse and of monitoring the Executive.
Elections express the principle of government by the consent
of the governed and should therefore be designed and organized in
a way that will enable the governed to choose the best available
candidates to represent them.58 An electoral system must be
designed, in other words, in such a way as to enable every citizen
to participate freely and fully in the election of representatives.
The Constitutional Commission of Eritrea included in its Issues
Papers a study of this subject and identified four general purposes
that must be served by elections:
1. reflection of the main opinions of the electorate;
2. establishment of majority rule;
3. election of suitable representatives; and
54 See id. at 131-37.
15 See id.
56 See ANDREW REEVE & ALAN WARE, ELECTORAL SYSTEMS: A COMPARATIVE AND
THEORETICAL INTRODUCTION 69-70 (1992).
"7 See id.
58 See DAVID M. FARRELL, COMPARING ELECTORAL SYSTEMS 2 (1997).
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4. formation of robust and stable government 9
Implicit in these general purposes is that the elections should
take place at regular intervals and for specified terms of office. In
Eritrea the five-year term of office is specified in the Constitution,
whereas details on the time of elections, as well as other details,
are left to future legislation. 6°  The fixed term of office, or
mandate, enables citizens to review the performance of their
elected representatives and to pass judgment at the next election
either by re-electing them or terminating their mandate and
choosing other candidates. Election time has thus juridical as well
as political significance. For electors and candidates alike, it is a
day of judgment on which the quality of representative
government depends.
A. Electoral Systems
There are different types of electoral systems reflecting varied
national political and demographic factors. Most typically,
however, they may be divided into two broad categories: the
majority system and the proportional representation (PR) system."
1. The Majority System
In the majority system, also known as "first-past-the-post," one
candidate is elected by a relative majority, that is, the person
obtaining the most votes from among competing candidates is
declared elected.62 Experience in many countries over the years
has shown that this system failed to fulfill the purposes listed
above, particularly in terms of reflecting the views or interests of
the true majority of electing citizens.63 The following example of
voting results of four candidates participating in a majority system
election illustrates this problem.
59 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION OF ERITREA (CCE), ISSUE PAPER No. 1, PT.
2: ELECTORAL SYSTEMS § A (on file with author).
60 See ERI. CONST. art. 30(2), art. 31(5).
61 See FARRELL, supra note 58, at 5.
62 See id. at 12-13.
63 See id. at 6-11, 143.
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Candidates Votes Obtained
A 7,000
B 4,000
C 3,500
D 2,500
The majority voting system fails to represent majority views,
in that Candidate A would be declared elected with a vote of 7000,
whereas the combined vote for Candidates B, C and D is 10,000.
Given a second chance, it is conceivable that the voters might
prefer Candidate B or C.
A study of the election history of several countries shows that
attempts have been made to remedy this inherent weakness of the
system.64 One solution is to provide for additional ballots in order
to give people an opportunity to re-cast their votes in favor of one
or the other of the candidates who received fewer votes on the first
count. 65 The second-ballot system allows voters a chance to recast
their votes in light of the results of the first ballot.6 6 While this
second vote does help to identify the true majority choice, it does
not alleviate another problem of majority systems.67 It does not
improve the representation of minority groups.68 Both majority
systems lead to underrepresentation of smaller parties or groupsw i t h i n • 69
within parties. The alternative is Proportional Representation.
2. Proportional Representation
Proportional representation has been advanced as a better
electoral formula, particularly for countries with multiethnic
composition, as is the case in most African countries 70  The
principal argument in favor of PR is that it protects minorities by
6 See id. at 40-50.
65 See id. at 40-41.
66 See id. at 41.
67 See id. at 58.
68 See id.
69 See id. at 37, 58.
70 See id. at 61.
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facilitating their representation in national politics.7' Studies
conducted recently on Southern African elections purport to
demonstrate the superiority of PR.72 These studies of five African
democracies show that the use of a majority system in Africa
"freezes the party system to such a degree that the alteration of
parties in government and opposition is not perceived as a likely or
natural occurrence. 73
The comparative advantage of PR over the majority system
should be analyzed in relation to party politics. Proportional
representation is party-based, whereas majoritarian systems are
candidate-based.74 The primary consideration is that parties obtain
seats in the Parliament in proportion to their support in the
electorate. 75 This is more possible under PR system than under the
majority system.76  The simplest system of proportional
representation divides the number of seats in a constituency
according to the total votes cast in an election so that each party
obtains a share of seats in proportion to the votes it obtains at the
polls." For example, in a constituency where 150,000 votes are
cast and the constituency is entitled to five seats in Parliament,
each party will be entitled to one seat for every 30,000 votes it gets
at the polls. Different variations of this formula have been used in
an attempt to secure more equitable representation.78 Opinions
differ as to the value of PR; some critics even argue that it is not
suitable to some societies.79
7' See id. at 84.
72 See Debate: PR and Southern Africa: Joel D. Barkan, Election in Agrarian
Societies, and Andrew Reynolds, The Case for Proportionality, J. DEMOCRACY, Oct.
1995, at 106, 118-22.
71 Reynolds, supra note 72, at 107.
74 See FARRELL, supra note 58, at 59.
71 See id. at 60.
76 See id.
77 See id.
78 See id. at 59.
79 See Barkan, supra note 72, at 106. Barkan maintains that proportional
representation does not result in a more fair representation of the population where the
majority of the people are agrarian, and that PR results in an unfortunate lack of linkage
between the representatives and their constituencies. See id. at 107. This lack of
linkage, he asserts, "greatly reduces the prospects for the consolidation of democratic
[Vol. 24
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The principal criticism of PR is that it weakens the link
between the individual members of Parliament and their
constituencies.0 This prevents the development of what has been
called the "vertical" dimension of democracy-the
representational relationship between the political elite and the
"ordinary people" with a common political interest-and reduces
the prospects for the consolidation of democratic rule.'
B. The Electoral System in Eritrea
These arguments, among others, will no doubt be considered
and weighed carefully when the Eritrean Parliament debates the
bill on electoral laws. A committee on electoral laws had begun
its work when the war broke out between Ethiopia and Eritrea. 2
The Constitutional Commission left the choice of electoral system
to be determined by legislation." It nonetheless debated the issue
at length. 4 In the course of the debate, it was pointed out that PR
assumes the existence of several parties, which is not the case in
Eritrea at the moment. Future legislation can adjust the rules to
reflect changing needs and demands, including the need to enable
proper representation for small parties.
In this respect, the question of ethnic minorities is relevant. In
the event that the awaited legislation on political parties prohibits
the formation of political parties on religious and ethnic bases, as
it is likely to do, ensuring equitable ethnic representation becomes
a relevant issue. In the Eritrean context, the governing party,
starting from its formation in the early 1970s, practiced an
inclusive national politics in which all the ethnic groups were
rule." Id.
80 See FARRELL, supra note 58, at 84-85.
8l See id.
82 The Committee is chaired by the former President of the National Union of
Eritrean Women and was originally expected to prepare the electoral law by the middle
of 1998. There was also a widely held public belief that the same committee would
prepare a draft law on the registration of political parities.
83 See ERi. CONST. art. 30(2). The Constitution provides that the National
Assembly shall enact an electoral law "which shall ensure the representation and
participation of the Eritrean people." Id." This was the recommendation in the
Commission's Proposal. See CCE: PROPOSALS, supra note 2, at 28.
84 See CCE: PROPOSALS, supra note 2, at 28.
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encouraged to, and did, join. This policy has continued after
independence as one of the basic principles of the PFDJ, as
evidenced by the few consultation meetings that the Constitutional
Commission held with top PFDJ leaders, as well as speeches of
the Chairman and other leaders.85
In the future deliberations of the Parliament, the principal
objective should be fair and equitable representation of the whole
population in the nation's legislative body. Whatever the system
chosen, it must be capable of ensuring such fair and adequate
representation.
C. The Electoral Commission
The Constitution provides for the establishment of an Electoral
Commission." The Constitution is fastidious about the operational
independence of the Electoral Commission, as the integrity of the
electoral process must be scrupulously maintained. It provides
that the Commission must operate independently, without any
interference, in order to "ensure that free and fair elections are
held. 87  The Commission is empowered to manage the
implementation of the elections, "decide on issues raised in the
course of the electoral process[,] and formulate and implement
civic educational programmes relating to elections and other
democratic procedures."88  The Electoral Commissioners are
appointed by the President; the National Assembly must approve
them.89 Details on the powers, duties, and organization of the
electoral commission are to be determined by laws enacted by the
National Assembly.90
IV. Composition and Function of the Eritrean Parliament
The Eritrean Parliament consists of a single-chamber National
85 See President Isaias Afwerki, Speech to the First Party Conference (Aug. 1995)
(emphasizing the need to deepen and maintain the national, rather than parochial,
consciousness) (transcript on file with author).
86 See ER. CONST. art. 58(1).
87 Id.
88 Id.
89 See id. art. 58(2).
90 See id. art. 58(3).
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Assembly.9' It is composed of representatives of the people
elected by secret ballot by all citizens who are qualified to vote."
All Eritrean citizens eighteen years of age or older have the right
to vote. 93  The qualifications and election of members of
Parliament and the conditions for vacating their seats are
determined by legislation issued by Parliament.94  Members of
Parliament (MPs), though elected from particular electoral
districts, are representatives of the Eritrean people as a whole. In
carrying out their duties as MPs, "they are governed by the
objectives and principles of the Constitution, the interest of the
people and the country and their conscience." 95
Parliamentary mandate lasts for a term of five years from the
day of the first session held following a general election.96
Parliament may, by a vote of at least two-thirds of all members,
extend its term for a period not exceeding six months.97 This may
only occur in exceptional situations, such as where there exists a
state of war or another state of emergency which would prevent a
normal election from being held.98
Three topics of the preceding discussion need elaboration: the
single-chamber nature of the Eritrean Parliament; universal, direct
and secret suffrage; and the national character of the MP's duties.
A. Single Chamber Assembly
What led Eritrean constitution-makers to choose a single-
chamber Parliament instead of a two-chamber Parliament? This
question was one of the twenty-three issues with which the
Constitutional Commission grappled at the start of its work and
was, accordingly, a subject of research. The team that researched
the subject submitted a report with a divided opinion: a majority
9' See id. art. 3 1.
92 See id. art. 31(2), (3).
" See id. art. 30(1).
9' See id. art. 31(6).
95 Id. art. 3 1(4).
96 See id. art. 31(5).
9' See id.
98 See id. art. 27. Article 27 defines a state of emergency as required for the
extension of a Parliamentary term. See id.
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proposing a single-chamber Parliament and a minority view
arguing in favor of a two-chamber Parliament.99
The arguments advanced in support of a two-chamber
Parliament espoused three principal advantages: (a) it ensures
wider representation of a nation, especially one with a multiethnic
composition; (b) it can guarantee the creation of better laws and
policies because it ensures more deliberation and an ampler time-
frame; and (c) it can help in the resolution of tension that may
arise out of controversies between the Executive and Legislative
branches.'l° The proponents of this minority view recognized two
drawbacks of a two-chamber Parliament: that it may involve
delays and greater expense. Nonetheless, they cogently argued
that the benefits outweigh these disadvantages. 0'
The majority view argued that a single-chamber Parliament
was advantageous because: (a) it better reflects the sovereignty of
the people and enacts laws without undue concern over the special
interests in society, whether based on ethnicity or class; (b) it is
speedy; and (c) it is less costly.' °2 The supporters of the majority
view were aware of the drawbacks of potential haste and tension
that might arise between the Executive and Legislative branches
but argued that the advantages outweigh the drawbacks and that
constitutional provisions can be devised to overcome them.'03 This
group further argued that a nation like Eritrea requires a dynamic
leadership, one that reflects unified representation of the people in
one chamber, even in the context of a future multiparty system.104
Whatever merit the two-chamber system may have in other
situations, the historical and socio-political circumstances of
Eritrea create a risk that a two-party chamber may
constitutionalize divisions that have been resolved, most recently
in a thirty-year armed struggle against a common enemy. The
"objective" conditions of a country must determine the type of
99 See BEREKET HABTE SELASSIE, REPORT OF THE CHAIRMAN OF THE
CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION (1995) (on file with author).
'0o See id.
10' See id.
102 See id.
'0' See id.
14 See id.
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system constitution-makers adopt.
The Commission accepted these arguments and decided to
adopt a single-chamber Parliament.° 5 In making such a choice, the
Commission added a further point: whatever groups in society
might have merited representation in a second chamber can be
accommodated through the careful crafting of electoral laws and
procedures.' 6 In this respect, the Commission considered, but
ultimately rejected, the practice followed in some countries,
whereby the head of State appoints to the Parliament members of
certain social groups, such as elders, chieftains, or professional
people.107 In the considered opinion of the Commission, such
people can and should be encouraged to enter Parliament through
the electoral process. 08
B. Universal Suffrage
A detailed discussion of universal suffrage is unnecessary
beyond stressing its constitutional significance as a cornerstone in
the edifice of parliamentary democracy.' 9  Voting must be
universal; every adult citizen qualified to vote must have the right
to vote. Further, the vote must be direct and secret.
Universal adult suffrage historically marks the triumph of the
common people over a prior system of suffrage that was limited to
the privileged classes.10 In England, known as the home of
modern parliamentary government, the common people did not
win this right until the British Parliament passed the Reform Act
of 1832, and even then, the right was limited for several more
decades by the requirement of property ownership."' Moreover,
the suffragette movement battled until almost 1920 to win the right
for women to vote in England, and even later in some European
'o' See ERI. CONST. art. 31:
106 See SELASSIE, supra note 99.
107 See id.
10' See id.
'09 See ROBERT RIENOW, INTRODUCTION TO GOVERNMENT 322-25 (2d ed. rev. 1960).
"0 See id. 320-22, 324-25.
"'. See id. at 321.
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countries.' 12
The requirement of direct voting should be distinguished from
indirect voting. Indirect voting is exercised through community or
clan leaders or through elected members of local assemblies."3 In
other words, citizens do not directly elect their representatives but
"vote only for persons who in turn select the representatives.""| 4
Indirect voting is a rare political phenomenon today.' Direct
voting, by contrast, involves the election of candidates for political
office by the voters themselves, without the intervention of an
intermediary body." 1
6
The secrecy principle ensures that the elector votes in an
enclosed space out of public view.' " This essential requirement
enables citizens to exercise the right to vote without fear or
pressure of any kind."' The electoral laws must make provisions
to facilitate this requirement, as well as other requirements, in
order to ensure a free and fair election. The practice of having
election observers witness the electoral process also helps in such
an endeavor.
In the Constitution of Eritrea, the principles of democracy and
people's sovereignty are clearly defined. The Constitution
provides that in the State of Eritrea "sovereign power is vested in
the people, and shall be exercised pursuant to the provisions of this
Constitution.""' 9 Additionally, the equal participation of citizens
"in all areas of human endeavor" is guaranteed.2 °
The Constitution requires Members of Parliament to discharge
their duties by thinking of themselves first and foremost as
112 See REEVE& WARE, supra note 56, at 52; RIENOW, supra note 109, at 331-32.
"13 See RIENOW, supra note 109, at 333.
114 Id.
"15 See id.
116 See id.
117 See id.
118 See id. at 333-34.
"I ERI. CONST. art. 1(3).
120 Id. art. 7(1). Article 7 requires the State to create the necessary conditions and
institutions to realize the democratic idea. See id. Electoral and voting laws further the
realization of the democratic idea by enabling citizens to exercise their sovereign power
through duly elected representatives. See FARRELL, supra note 58, at 5.
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representatives of the whole nation. 2 ' This does not mean that
they fail to consider their constituencies; on the contrary, they
must also represent the views and interests of their constituents
and maintain regular contact with them. 2  The Constitution
enjoins members of Parliament to "maintain the high honor of
their office and to conduct themselves as humble servants of the
people."'23
C. Powers and Duties of Parliament
The members of the National Assembly collectively constitute
the Legislature. Following their election, and by virtue of their
election, the representatives of the people are collectively invested
with governmental authority. The members of the Legislature
who are elected directly by the people collectively embody the
democratic idea of representative government. This democratic
idea must then be translated into legislative power.
The powers of the Legislature may be divided into four main
categories: (1) legislation; (2) oversight of executive or
administrative matters; (3) hearing citizen complaints; and (4)
approval of appointments.
1. Legislation
The National Assembly must be bound by the principles
enumerated in the Constitution and is bound by duty to strive to
fulfill the objectives stated therein. 24  According to the
Constitution, it has the power "to enact laws and pass resolutions
for the peace, stability, development and social justice of
Eritrea."'' 25  Parliament (the National Assembly) is the sole
legislative authority of the State and any matters that are
legislative in nature must come from Parliament or by delegation
from Parliament.2 6 Such delegation must itself come under the
121 See ERI. CONST. art. 38(1).
122 See id.
123 Id.
124 See id. art. 32(2).
125 Id. art. 32(1)(a).
126 See id. art. 32(I)(b).
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authority of law passed by Parliament."7  The Constitution
states: "[u]nless authorized pursuant to the provisions of this
Constitution and law enacted by the National Assembly, no person
or organization shall have the power to make decisions having the
force of law."'28
This being the principle, it must, nonetheless, be noted that the
Executive branch of government impinges on the legislative power
of Parliament in two respects. First, it has the power of initiative
and the near-monopoly of expertise in researching and preparing
draft bills, which it then presents to Parliament for its deliberation
and enactment."9 Secondly, the Executive may impinge upon the
Legislature through delegated legislation.'3
The comparatively greater resources at the command of the
Executive branch give it an advantage in the preparation and
submission of draft legislation. In Eritrea, there is an
overwhelming advantage in favor of the Executive branch. 3' In
terms of constitutional principle, Parliament can reject all drafts
prepared by the Executive.'32 In practice, this rarely occurs for
both political and pragmatic reasons. A government in a
parliamentary system enjoys a majority of votes in Parliament on
which it can rely to ensure the passage of draft laws that it
submits. The party in power can almost always rely on its
members. In some instances, such as those involving moral
issues, like abortion, capital punishment, or other human rights
issues, members may "vote their consciences." In these situations
the party whips, who enforce party discipline in Parliament,
normally release members from the obligation to "toe the line."'33
127 See id.
128 Id.
129 See id. art. 42(15).
130 See id. art. 32(7).
131 Shortage of trained human resources is one of the major constraints in the
country's development efforts. Literacy stands at 20% at the present. See CHRIS
PROUTY & EUGENE ROSENFELD, HISTORICAL DICTIONARY OF ETHIOPIA AND ERITREA xix
(2d ed. 1994). The constraint affects not only the relative shortage of experts to research
for and advise Parliament but also the membership of Parliament itself. Parliament may
not include college graduates for many years to come.
132 See ERI. CONST. art. 32(l)(b).
133 See RIENOW, supra note 109, at 248-49.
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In the Constitution of Eritrea, the areas of legislation under
which only Parliament has authority include approval of the
national budget and enactment of tax law, 34 ratification of
international agreements, 135 approval of government borrowing,
13 6
and approval of state of peace, war, or national emergency. 137 The
Constitution contains an "omnibus" clause that gives power to
Parliament to pass laws or resolution "for the peace, stability,
development and social justice of Eritrea."'38 Theoretically,
Parliament can take initiative, or cause initiative to be taken, to
research, study, and pass laws concerning the matters of national
stability, development, and good governance. Almost any subject
can be covered by these topics. In practice, however, the
Executive branch of the government will most often take the
initiative.
The Executive may also encroach upon the power of the
Legislature to make law through delegation of power. 139 Major
legislation passed by Parliament often contains an enabling clause,
under which Parliament delegates its legislative authority to a
Minister or another member of the Executive. In the hierarchy of
the law, the higher law, starting with the Constitution, contains
basic principles or major policy issues that lay down the
framework of powers and duties or rights and obligations. The
provisions become more detailed lower in the hierarchy, from the
minute details on organization of municipal government, for
example, to the circulars or guidelines that a Minister issues for his
employees to follow. It is in the establishment of these details that
the Executive, in effect, makes law.
2. Parliamentary Oversight and Audience of
Citizens' Complaints
The Constitution gives power to Parliament "to oversee the
114 See ERI. CONST. art. 32(3).
13' See id. art. 32(4).
136 See id. art. 32(5).
131 See id. art. 32(6).
13I d. art. 32(1)(a).
1 See id. art 32(7).
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execution of laws"'' 40 and "to enact all such laws and pass all such
resolutions and to undertake all such measures as are necessary
and to establish such standing or ad hoc committees as it deems
appropriate for discharging its constitutional responsibilities.''
The power of Parliament to oversee the work of the Executive
rests on the principle of popular sovereignty, which Parliament
represents by virtue of its election by the people. 42 The electoral
process involves, as previously noted, investiture of legislative
authority collectively on those who are elected to represent the
people.' 43 It also involves a legitimizing process under which the
voting public transfers power to Parliament based on the public's
sovereignty. This legitimization extends to the initiation,
monitoring, and control of government policy.
There is thus an organic link between the various categories
under which Parliament seeks to exercise its power. Hence, the
combined treatment of two topics, oversight of executive and
administrative matters and the hearing of citizens' complaints,
appears under this sub-section. The initial impetus that sets the
machinery of inquiry, monitoring, or control in motion may come
from an individual member of Parliament or a committee of
Parliament, or it may be based on the complaints of citizens either
as affected individuals or groups or as concerned citizens.' 44 This
process, and the parliamentary power on which it is based, makes
for a healthy interaction between government and citizens.
Through its power of oversight, normally exercised through
parliamentary committees, the Legislature activates the principle
of government accountability, thus accomplishing two basic and
related purposes: keeping the members of the Executive branch
"on a leash" and addressing citizens' grievances.141
How this task is performed is a question related to the matter
of parliamentary process, discussed in the next section. 46
140 Id.
141 Id. art. 32(12).
142 See RIENOW, supra note 109, at 218-19.
143 See supra notes 59-79 and accompanying text.
144 See RIENOW, supra note 109, at 218-19.
14" See ERI. CONST. art. 32(8)-(12).
146 See infra notes 163-90 and accompanying text.
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However, it should be noted that there are several ways in which
citizens' grievances may be aired and addressed. 47 There may be a
variety of public forums organized in pursuance of the citizens'
rights of freedom of association, opinion and conscience, notably
the right to use the press and other media to those ends.1
48
Experience has shown that practices develop, and that those
practices may become constitutional conventions under which
rights are exercised and are balanced by responsibilities.1 49 It takes
time before such conventions become an accepted part of the
constitutional process and the parliamentary immunity of members
of the Legislature plays a crucial role in the development,
nurturing, and maintenance of such conventions, which give life
and force to the text of the Constitution.
150
3. Approval of Appointments
The power of appointment is one of the powers reserved to the
Executive branch, notably to the President.' 5' There are certain
offices of the state, however, that are regarded as so important that
the appointment of people to fill them requires parliamentary
approval. The Constitution of Eritrea has singled out the
following office holders to be subject to such Parliamentary
approval: all Ministers, all Commissioners, Auditor-General,
Governor of the Bank, and Chief Justice.
152
Article 42(7) of the Constitution adds to the offices listed
above the following: "and any other person or persons who are
required by any other provisions of this Constitution or other laws
to be appointed by the President."'53 Justices of the Supreme Court
are such persons; their appointment is dependent upon the
proposal of the Judicial Service Commission, which is then
submitted to the National Assembly by the President. '
4
147 See ERI. CONST. arts. 6, 32(12).
148 See id. arts. 6(2), 7(7), 19.
149 See STEPHEN D. TANSEY, POLmCS: THE BASICS 166-67 (1995).
'50 See id.
' ' See ERL CONST. art. 42(7)-(11).
152 See id. art. 42(7).
153 Id.
154 See id. art. 42(8).
1999]
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
Additionally, it should be noted that the appointment of judges of
the lower courts does not require parliamentary approval,'55 nor do
the appointments of ambassadors and other diplomatic
representatives,'56 and high ranking members of the Armed and
Security Forces."7
The scope of the constitutionally required parliamentary
approval of the appointment of office-holders varies from country
to country. In some jurisdictions it involves all diplomatic
appointments at the ambassadorial level, high court judges, and
junior ministers. This is the case in the United States, for instance,
which includes the appointment of all federal judges.' In other
systems, such as that in France, parliamentary approval is limited
to cabinet ministers, who are judged collectively as members of
the government of the day. 5 9 The parliamentary "judgment" is
rendered, not so much on the basis of the individual minister's
merit, as on the program or general policy submitted by the Prime
Minister and his cabinet.6 ° The same is true in Britain and other
parliamentary systems.
161
Parliamentary approval of presidential appointment of office-
holders under the Eritrean constitutional system, which is a
compromise system uniquely combining aspects of the
presidential and parliamentary systems, is appropriately limited to
those listed above. 162 All are high positions of crucial importance
to the nation, covering various aspects of its life. The Ministers
collectively represent extensive authority. The approval of this
appointment is the "first line of defense" in Parliament's role in
the system of checks and balances. The case of the
Commissioners is similar to that of Ministers; although they are
155 See id. art. 42(9).
156 See id. art, 42(10).
157 See id. art. 42(11).
158 See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
'19 See GILBERT ABCARIAN & GEORGE S. MASANNAT, CONTEMPORARY POLITICAL
SYSTEMS 220-21 (1970).
160 See FR. CONST. tit. IV, art. 23; VINCENT WRIGHT, THE CONSTITUTION AND
POLITICS OF FRANCE 134-36 (1989).
161 See ABCARIAN & MASANNAT, supra note 159, at 214-17.
162 See supra notes 152-54 and accompanying text.
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not members of the Cabinet, they perform functions that are as
important as ministerial functions. To take the example of the
Commissioner of Elections, he or she is, as was previously noted,
the repository of the trust of the nation in election matters and is
entrusted with guaranteeing the integrity of the electoral process.
Such an office-holder must necessarily be appointed with the
approval of Parliament. The same is true with the Auditor-
General, the Governor of the National Bank, and the Chief Justice
and Justices of the Supreme Court.
V. Parliamentary Process
Parliamentary life is defined by parliamentary process. The
process itself is measured by rules of procedure governing the
internal institutions that comprise Parliament and the dynamics of
their operation, as well as their relationship with the Executive
branch of government. As declared by the Eritrean Constitution,
Parliament may pass laws or resolutions and "undertake all such
measures as are necessary and to establish such standing or ad hoc
committees as it deems appropriate for discharging its
constitutional responsibilities."' 163 The committees that Parliament
creates, and the rules on procedure that it lays down, are designed
to enable it to discharge its constitutional responsibility and to
exercise its powers. 64 The Constitution provides the basis for the
accomplishment of these tasks and for the resolution of any
potential conflicts that may arise in Parliament's performance of
its duties or the exercise of its power.1
65
A. Parliamentary Rules of Procedure
The Constitution lays down, in broad outline, the rules under
which the National Assembly (Parliament) is required to have
regular sessions and is authorized to determine the timing and
duration of its regular sessions.'66 The National Assembly issues
"rules and regulations concerning its operations and tasks and the
organisation of the standing and ad hoc committees and its
163 ERi. CONST. art. 32(12).
164 See CCE: PROPOSALS, supra note 2, at 20-22 (1995).
165 See infra notes 166-90 and accompanying text.
166 See ER. CONST. art. 36(1).
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Secretariat, as well as the rules governing the code of conduct of
its members and transparency of its operations."'67
Voting procedure is so important that it is made the subject of
a constitutional provision. The Constitution provides as
follows: "Except as otherwise prescribed by this Constitution, any
question proposed for decision of the National Assembly shall be
determined by a majority vote of those present and voting, and in
case of a tie of votes, the Chairperson may exercise a casting
vote.' ' 168 The exceptions to the voting procedure referred to in this
provision should be noted.
169
But first, a word of explanation of the phrase "a majority of
those present and voting" is in order. This is sometimes called a
simple, or relative, majority. It must be distinguished from the
absolute majority that is required by the Constitution, for example,
for the election of the President. 170 The rule of the Constitution,
then, is that unless otherwise provided, all questions in Parliament
are determined by a relative majority, that is, by majority vote of
those present and voting. 7' The question may arise: How many of
the members of Parliament must be present before matters can be
debated and/or submitted for voting? Is there an irreducible
minimum, and, if so, how is it determined? What if only 20 out of
120 members are present? Or even 30 or 40? What are the criteria
for determining a minimum? These are among the questions that
Parliament itself will answer in its internal rules and regulations.
An exception to the relative majority rule is, as noted before,
the absolute majority rule, which requires the presence of all
members. Parliament may add more issues to the rank of those to
be determined by an absolute majority.' 72 Another exception is
where a higher proportion of vote is required constitutionally, as in
the case of amending the Constitution.'73 Different constitutions
167 Id. art. 36(5).
168 Id. art. 36(4).
169 See infra notes 172-78 and accompanying text.
170 See ER. CONST. art. 41(1).
171 See id. art. 36(4).
172 See id. arts. 32(12), 41(1).
173 See id. art. 59(2).
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require different percentages for this purpose.
The Constitution of Eritrea lays down a two-step procedure for
constitutional amendment following a proposal tabled for such an
amendment. 114  The initial proposal for amendment of any
provision of the Constitution may be tabled by the President or
fifty percent of all members of the National Assembly.'75 The
amendment proposal will then be debated by all the members of
the National Assembly, and if seventy-five percent of all the
members vote in favor of the amendment, the matter will be put on
record and await final disposal by Parliament the following year.1
7 6
A one-year period must elapse before the matter can be taken up
again. 7 7 In the event that, a year later, eighty percent of all the
members accept the amendment passed the previous year, then the
amendment will pass and on the effective date become a part of
the Constitution.
7 8
Parliament may be convened for an emergency meeting at the
request of the President, its Chairman, or one-third of all
members.'79 The most common emergency meeting would likely
be one in which the President convenes Parliament in accordance
with Article 27 of the Constitution of Eritrea.8 ° Very rarely, the
Chairperson or members may request such a meeting, particularly
in the event of political crises facing the nation in which the
President is either unable or unwilling to call a meeting."'
Another point relating to parliamentary rules of procedure
concerns the approval of a draft law passed by Parliament. The
Constitution's provision is simple: "Any draft law approved by the
National Assembly shall be transmitted to the President who,
within thirty days of its receipt, shall sign and have it published in
174 See id. art. 59.
171 See id. art. 59(1).
176 See id. art. 59(2)(a).
177 See id. art. 59(2)(b).
171 See id. art. 59(2).
179 See id. art. 36(2).
180 See id. art. 27; EDWARD MCWHINNEY, CONSTITUTION-MAKING: PRINCIPLES,
PROCESS, PRACTICE 81-85 (1981) (discussing the concept of constitutional emergency).
l8l See ERI. CONST. art. 32(12).
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the Official Gazette."'82  During the research and subsequent
discussion phases of the Constitutional Commission's work, the
question of the approval of draft laws was among many that were
hotly debated. It was debated in relation to the larger
question: What form of government would be suitable for Eritrea?
The approval procedure of a draft law and related rules in
presidential systems is different from that under parliamentary
systems. In a presidential system with a strict separation of
powers, the president may reject a parliamentary draft law.'83
Rules must be devised constitutionally for the resolution of such
conflict, if and when it occurs. Under the U.S. Constitution, a
presidential veto of a draft law passed by Congress (Parliament)
will "kill" the draft unless Congress overrides the veto by a two-
thirds majority.'"
In single-chamber parliamentary systems, all that is required is
a majority of votes in the chamber supporting the party in power.'85
This may be complicated where, in a Parliament elected under
proportional representation, there are a number of parties whose
total votes may outnumber those of the principal party.1
86
Moreover, in a two-chamber Parliament, the process may be
further complicated in the event of a split in the votes that may
necessitate a joint session of both chambers to settle the split. 17
In Eritrea, which is a parliamentary system with an executive
President, a draft law passed by Parliament cannot be questioned
or returned for review but must be published as law. "8 This is a
constitutional requirement.' 9 However, in the vast majority of
cases, it is the Executive that proposes laws to be enacted by the
Legislature. 9 0
182 Id. art. 33.
183 See MCWHINNEY, supra note 180, at 69.
184 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2.
185 See FARRELL, supra note 58, at 161-68.
186 See id. at 59-60.
187 See id. at 39-58.
188 See ERI. CONST. art. 33.
189 See id.
190 See supra notes 129, 131-38 and accompanying text.
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VI. Conclusion
This Article began with a brief discussion of the idea of
democracy as a source of representative government.
Parliamentary government, per se, does not a democracy make,
although it provides the basic institutional muscle to establish
democracy at the national level. The role of Parliament in Eritrea
is a yet uncharted terrain. The transitional National Assembly that
has been functioning since the country's independence is not a
full-fledged Parliament. Its latest version is comprised of the
entire membership of the Central Council of the governing party,
PFDJ, and elected members of the country's regional assemblies.
No independent study has been attempted regarding its
performance, there has been no publication of the minutes of its
proceedings, and there is no public attendance of its meetings.
This may be explained in terms of its provenance: it emerged out
of the history of the PFDJ in Eritrea's war of liberation. A critical
feature of the function of the PFDJ's Central Committee, the
Central Council's predecessor, -was secrecy and discipline,
essential requirements for the prosecution of the war.
These and related points have been raised and extensively
debated in the context of the need for government accountability
and transparency. The Eritrean people have earned a place under
the democratic sun, both in terms of their recent history and
traditions of village self-government. But, as was previously
noted, Eritrea's venture into constitutional government may be
marked, for a few years, by the operation of a single dominant
party. There will nonetheless be expectations--or even
demands-for multiparty democracy. Much will depend on the
operation of a number of factors, prominent among which is the
performance of the Eritrean economy. If the economy's
performance is satisfactory, providing optimal employment and
other benefits to the people, it could induce a degree of
complacency, postponing demands for multiparty representation.
As for Parliament, the enormous power vested in it by the
Constitution should enable it to play a crucial role in the political
health and development of the country. This has naturally raised
great expectations for democracy. A responsible Parliament will
appreciate the significance of its responsibility, even in the short
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run, particularly in the- absence of official opposition parties. This
will be particularly important as Parliament endeavors to act as
guardian of civil freedoms, while cooperating with the Executive
branch in promoting the country's economic growth and social
progress.
The first test of the present Parliament will be the development
of electoral laws and laws regarding political parties.
Additionally, the law on the freedom of the press is still the
subject of controversy, at least among the budding private
newspapers and their reading public. Beyond these immediate
tasks, Parliament will face enormous challenges as a representative
and lawmaking institution. These challenges may be summed up
under three categories: (1) government and the rule of law; (2) the
challenges facing democracy; and (3) development, social justice,
and human rights.
A. Government and the Rule of Law
That the rule of law, or the principle of legality, as it is known
under European civil law systems, anchors constitutional
government is beyond dispute. A good government is one that
rules according to the law, not according to the whims or caprice
of those who are in power. The underlying principle of the rule of
law is simple: it guarantees certainty of rights, equal justice under
the law, and freedom from arbitrary treatment of citizens. It thus
provides the conditions for obedience of the law and ensures the
peace and stability that goes with it.
That is how it works in theory, at least. In practice,
governments have been known, throughout history, to ignore the
rule of law and establish, or perpetuate, arbitrary personal rule. It
is an important aspect of democratic transition in modern times
that arbitrary rule is rare and, where it exists, it is on the defensive.
Arbitrary rulers almost always use patriotic terms to justify their
rule, reminding one of Samuel Johnson's famous line: "Patriotism
is the last refuge of scoundrels." '91
One of the tasks of Parliament will be to guard against any
arbitrary acts or tendencies of the Executive branch or any one of
'9' JAMES BOSWELL, LIFE OF JOHNSON (Apr. 7, 1775) (1791).
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its agencies in the conduct of government business. The principles
or criteria for judging such acts or tendencies are contained in the
Constitution and should be elaborated under laws issued by
Parliament.'92 As an Eritrean elder put it at a village meeting
during the constitution-making process: "The govemment needs a
strong hand to be able to govern, but it must be harnessed by the
lugam of the law."' 93 The elder's point about the need for a strong
government is well taken. The Constitutional Commission of
Eritrea gave due emphasis to the need for a vigorous government
administration but underscored the need for such a government to
abide by the rule of law, to be accountable and transparent in its
work.'94 The primary responsibility for ensuring these safeguards
lies with Parliament.
B. The Challenges Facing Democracy
Winston Churchill said of democracy that "it is the worst form
of govemment, except for all those other forms that have been
tried from time to time."' ' Democracy requires constant vigilance
and struggle. In the dynamics of the exercise of governmental
power, a country's leadership has the responsibility to offer a
vision and define policies and programs to actualize such vision.
When engaged in such exercise in a democratic context, or when
following democratic procedures, a leadership may face problems
or constraints. In short, it may face seemingly insuperable
challenges. It is the task of lawyers and political scientists and of
all concerned citizens to monitor and evaluate the manner in which
a leadership responds to such challenges. It is the business of
Parliament to do so on a daily basis.
When a challenge becomes acute, it might be tempting for a
leadership to follow the line of least resistance-to suspend
democratic procedures and impose emergency measures in the
name of national unity and stability. To avoid such an occurrence,
192 See ERI. CONST. art. 7.
"I Village Elder, Public Discussion at Ad'Tekelezan (Summer 1996). Lugam
means the bridle that guides horses or mules. Here it is used as a metaphor for control
and accountability.
194 See CCE: PROPOSALS, supra note 2, at 10.
'9' JAMES C. HUMES, THE WIT AND WISDOM OF WINSTON CHURCHILL 28 (1994).
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the Constitution provides for the type of situations when a state of
emergency may be declared with the approval of Parliament. 196
C. Development, Social Justice, and Human Rights
The people and Parliament of Eritrea need to maintain a clear
understanding of the meaning of development as a basis for
ensuring social justice and human rights. Very simply stated, a
definition of development as the source of, or condition for,
human well-being, should include having more, doing more,
knowing more, and being more.
1. Having, Doing, and Knowing More
When a country experiences economic growth, government
should make sure that the benefits of such growth are equitably
distributed. Without equitable distribution, growth will only
benefit the privileged few. But without growth there is a slim
chance of equitable distribution. The need for the quantitative
element of development-having more-is thus an imperative of
development. This necessarily involves increased activity in
various sectors of the economy. This requires doing more.
Knowing more implies, among other things, education and raising
the cultural level of the population in general. The Constitution
enjoins the State to create and promote "conditions conducive for
developing a national culture capable of expressing national
identity, unity and progress of the Eritrean people."' 97
2. Being More
This category is difficult to explain; it reflects existential
issues, including quality of life and spiritual matters. It is vitally
linked to social justice and human rights in all its varieties as
conceived and articulated in various international legal
instruments, such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of
1948 and the 1966 international covenants.198
196 See ERI. CONST. art. 27.
197 Id. art. 9(1).
198 See International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, at 8, Dec.
16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3, U.N. Doc. ST/HR/1/Rev.5, U.N. Sales No. E.94.XIV.t
(1994); International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, at 20, Dec. 16, 1966, 99
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Many nations are also required by their constitutions to
observe and protect human rights and to promote social justice.
The Eritrean Constitution is no exception in this respect. 199  It
cannot be overstated, however, that the institutions of the State,
including Parliament, cannot fulfill their obligations under the
Constitution in the protection of human rights and promotion of
social justice without attending to the development imperative as
defined above. The State of Eritrea is required by the Constitution
to strive for the provision of social justice.'0o It is also required to
bring about a balanced and sustainable development throughout
the country and to "use all available means to enable all citizens to
improve their livelihood in a sustainable manner, through their
participation."20'
Parliament shares responsibility with the two other branches of
government in fulfilling the requirements of the Constitution and
other laws, including the development imperative, as outlined
above, the provision of social justice and the protection of human
rights. Parliament is, of course, only as good as its members.
There should be no place in Parliament for those who are not
inspired by the spirit of public service. The nature of its work
demands men and women of quality: principled, intelligent,
energetic, resilient, tenacious, and tough. The faint hearted need
not apply.
U.N.T.S. 171, U.N. Doc. ST/HR/1/Rev.5, U.N. Sales No. E.94.XIV.1 (1994). "All
people have the fight of self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely determine
their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development."
International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, supra, Art. I, at 8.
'99 See ERI. CONST. art. 14-29. These articles are contained in the longest chapter of
the Constitution, Chapter 3, which deals with human rights.
200 The Constitution provides: "The State shall strive to create opportunities to
ensure the fulfillment of citizens' rights to social justice and economic development and
to fulfill their material and spiritual needs." ER. CONST. art. 8(1).
201 ER. CONST. art. 8(2).
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